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Abstract
The prisoners dilemma (PD) is a game-theoretic model studied in a
wide array of fields to understand the emergence of cooperation between
rational self-interested agents. In this work, we formulate a spatial it-
erated PD as a discrete-event dynamical system where agents play the
game in each time-step and analyse it algebraically using Krohn-Rhodes
algebraic automata theory using a computational implementation of the
holonomy decomposition of transformation semigroups. In each iteration
all players adopt the most profitable strategy in their immediate neigh-
bourhood. Perturbations resetting the strategy of a given player provide
additional generating events for the dynamics.
Our initial study shows that the algebraic structure, including how
natural subsystems comprising permutation groups acting on the spatial
distributions of strategies, arise in certain parameter regimes for the pay-
off matrix, and are absent for other parameter regimes. Differences in the
number of group levels in the holonomy decomposition (an upper bound
for Krohn-Rhodes complexity) are revealed as more pools of reversibility
appear when the temptation to defect is at an intermediate level. Alge-
braic structure uncovered by this analysis can be interpreted to shed light
on the dynamics of the spatial iterated PD.
1 Introduction
Krohn-Rhodes (KR) theory offers powerful tools for understanding discrete-
event dynamical systems (e.g. [8]). This theory decomposes any system whose
dynamics can be represented as a transformation semigroup into a cascade of
permutation-group layers and identity-reset (flip-flop) layers using the wreath
product [5]. This yields a “coarse-to-fine graining” of both the system’s state
and its dynamical transformations. The decomposition process can uncover sub-
systems represented by permutation groups which we call pools of reversibility or
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natural subsystems (see below). Algebraic structure uncovered by this analysis
can be interpreted to shed light on the dynamics and complexity of many broad
classes of discrete-event dynamical systems, including models found in the field
of game theory.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is an extensively studied game which explores
the problem of individual vs. collective profit in a simple 2-strategy model. The
model is usually presented describing a situation where two partners-in-crime are
imprisoned and unable to communicate. The prosecutors lack evidence and can
only convict each prisoner for a lesser charge, so they offer the prisoners a deal.
This deal comes as a dilemma to the prisoners as they need to choose between
remaining silent or betraying their partner which would grant them a sentence
lighter than that of the lesser charge, only if their partner remains silent. These
two options can be represented as strategies in a game where remaining silent
is referred to as cooperation and betraying the partner-in-crime is referred to
as defection. This game can be applied to any situation in which there is a
temptation for individuals to defect, however the net benefit of all parties is
maximized if all individuals cooperate. It has been used to study the emergence
of cooperation in a wide array of models in the fields of ecology, economics and
psychology [1, 12, 13].
In the PD, the payoff matrix for a given player is usually represented by:
Player 2
D C
Player 1
D (a, a) (b, c)
C (c, b) (d, d)
(1)
where every cell corresponds to each player choosing a strategy of either defect
(D) or cooperate (C). The first and second elements of the tuple within each cell
represent the payoff of players 1 and 2 respectively. To represent the dilemma,
the payoffs are formulated with b > d > a > c and to have the net payoff
maximized for two cooperators, the system is further restricted such that 2d >
b + c. A common payoff matrix satisfying these conditions is:
Player 2
D C
Player 1
D (1, 1) (b, 0)
C (0, b) (3, 3)
(2)
where b > 3 is a parameter referred to as the temptation to defect. When
simulated as a two-player game, the players’ strategies will always converge to
defection since it is the Nash equilibrium [11]. However when iterated on a spa-
tial structure with local interactions, more complex behaviour arises, including
the persistence of cooperation due to the spatial clustering of alike strategies
[10, 9].
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2 Spatial Algebraic Model
For the model presented in this paper, the PD is iterated on rectangular lattice
with periodic boundary conditions where each cell represents a player with one
of two strategies; defection represented by ‘0’ and cooperation represented by
‘1’. A small 2× 3 lattice is used here due to current resource constraints of the
computational algebraic analysis, but is illustrative of the general phenomena
that arise.
Figure 1: The spatial arrangement and enumeration of
the cells on the 2× 3 spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma lattice
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The state space,
Xbin = {000000, 000001, 000010, 000011, ..., 111110, 111111} (3)
is made of 64 6-bit binary strings, where the ith bit from the left represents the
strategy of cell i (Figure 1). For a more notationally compact representation,
this state set can also be written in decimal form with each state being the
decimal integer equivalent of the binary string,
X = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 62, 63}. (4)
During each synchronous playing of the game, t (which we call a time step),
each cell plays the PD with their von Neumann neighbours and gains a net
payoff over all games using the payoff matrix (2). Note that since the system is
a 2×3 lattice, each cell has 3 von Neumann neighbours to avoid double-counting
existing neighbours with the periodic boundaries. After playing against each
other, each cell updates its strategy to match that of their neighbour with
maximal payoff, only if the maximal payoff is greater than their own. If two
neighbouring cells with different strategies have the same maximal payoff, then
cooperation is chosen.
To allow for more complexity, the model was formulated such that certain
cells can have their strategy perturbed outside of t-dependent strategy evolution.
We call these cells “open”. If cell i is open, there are two locally constant
mappings associated with that cell; di and ci. These correspond to mapping
the strategy of cell i to defection or cooperation respectively, regardless of the
change in payoff. These mappings on the set of open cells (denoted O) make a
set of locally constant mappings, resetting cell i’s strategy to either d or c but
leaving others’ unchanged.
T ′O = {di, ci}i∈O. (5)
The set of generators for the semigroup transformations is then given by
TO = T
′
O
⋃
{t}. (6)
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Words made from elements of TO define mappings on the set of states by apply-
ing each transformation in order from left to right. The set of transformations
generated from TO comprise a semigroup denoted by
SO = 〈TO〉, (7)
and SO acting on X gives us the transformation semigroup (X,SO). As T
′
O
is a set of locally constant mappings, it does not depend on the parameter b,
however t does and its b-dependence was explored using a python script which
also generated the semigroup mappings. In this analysis the strict inequality
b > 3 = d was relaxed so that b ≥ 3. Note that for b = 3, the system still
favours defection since although mutual cooperation has become a weak Nash
equilibrium, mutual defection is still the only strict Nash equilibrium, mean-
ing no player can change their strategy without suffering a loss in payoff. The
mappings generated by the python script were then read into GAP [7] and the
transformation semigroup was analyzed using the SgpDec package [2] to carry
out a holonomy decomposition [4, 8, 3]. This yields a KR decomposition of the
spatial PD model’s dynamics (X,SO) by identifying natural subsystems, i.e.,
nontrivial permutation groups whose state set is an image X · s of the state
set X under some semigroup element s ∈ SO and whose permutations are the
restrictions of those members of SO which permute this set. Such an image
set can be covered by the union of smaller image sets and singletons, which in
turn must also be permuted by these transformations. The permutation group
induced on the maximal covering sets of a natural subsystem by these sets is
a holonomy group. See [4, 8, 3] for details. In the next section, we will be
referencing subduction, a generalized inclusion relation defined on the collection
of images together with X and the singletons. For subsets P,Q ⊆ X, we say
P subducts Q if P ⊆ Q · s for some s ∈ S or s the identity mapping. Mu-
tual subduction implies isomorphism of holonomy groups, so equivalent locally
reversible dynamics in the hierarchical decomposition can be compressed [3],
giving insight into complexity of a dynamical system (X,S). In the analysis
and diagrams below, subduction corresponds to subset inclusion.
3 Complexity Regimes
The investigation of the iterated PD’s b-dependence revealed four different
regimes characterized by unique sets of transformations by t (Table 1). The
complexity of each regime was explored using the Krohn-Rhodes (KR) defini-
tion of semigroup complexity [6]: KR complexity is formulated such that the
complexity of a transformation semigroup (X,S) is equal to the smallest num-
ber of non-trivial groups needed for a wreath product decomposition of (X,S).
Therefore an upper bound for the KR complexity is the number of levels with
non-trivial groups in the holonomy decomposition. For the remainder of this
paper, upper bounds will be used when referring to KR complexity.
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Table 1: Four unique regimes of
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Regime Parameter Range
A b > 4.0
B b = 4.0
C 3.0 < b < 4.0
D b = 3.0
3.1 Regime A
Beginning with regime A (b > 4.0), the system has a temptation to defect so
large, that t2 acting on any state containing at least one defector will bring that
state to ‘000000’ (state 0), which we will call pure defection. (As t maps the
pure cooperation state ‘111111’ (state 63) to itself and no other states map to
63 by words generated by t, this state is left out of the subduction chains shown
in Figures 2 and 3.) The defection attractor dynamics can be visualized from
subduction chain for (X \ {63}, 〈t〉) (Figure 2). We can choose to only examine
the mappings induced by words generated by t when comparing regimes since the
semigroup generated by T ′O is unchanged by the parameter b. As t
2 only maps
to pure defection and the rest of the mappings in SO are locally constant maps,
there are no pools of reversibility and few levels in the holonomy decomposition,
yielding a relatively trivial system.
X \ {63}
{0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 17, 20, 32, 34, 40}
{0}
Figure 2: Subduction chain for
(X, 〈t〉) with b > 4
X \ {63}
{0, 5, 10, 17, 20, 21, 23, 29, 34, 40, 42, 43, 46, 53, 58}
{0, 21, 23, 29, 42, 43, 46, 53, 58}
Figure 3: Subduction chain for (X, 〈t〉) with
b = 4
3.2 Regime B
Regime B (b = 4.0) can be seen as a critical point where the system changes
from regime A to C. The main difference between regimes A and B is that
mixed strategy equilibria under transformation t appear in regime B. These
equilibria fall under two spatial configurations up to isomorphism: “3-in-a-row
and “L-shape, shown in Figure 4. Similar to regime A, this regime does not
have non-trivial groups in the holonomy decomposition giving both regimes a
KR complexity of 0.3.3 Regime C
In regime C (3.0 < b < 4.0), the temptation to defect is at an intermediate level
which now allows certain states to map to ones of higher cooperation with t.
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(a) “3-in-a-row” strategy configuration (b) “L-shape” strategy configuration represented
represented by {21, 42} = [21]∼= ⊂ X by {23, 29, 43, 46, 53, 58} = [23]∼= ⊂ X
Figure 4: Mixed strategy equilibria configuration for regimes B and C. Hatched
pattern and no fill represent defector and cooperator strategies, respectively.
From the subduction chain (Figure 5) one can see that the decreased temptation
to defect removes one class of mixed strategy equilibria states, [21]∼=. In this
state, the defector’s net payoff is b + 2 as it receives b for playing against one
adjacent cooperator as well as 2 for playing against two adjacent defectors. Since
b < 4 in this regime, b + 2 < 6, the total payoff for cooperators and this state
will now map to pure cooperation when acted on by t.
Figure 5: Subduction chain for
(X, 〈t〉) with 3 < b < 4
X
{0, 5, 10, 17, 20, 23, 29, 34, 40, 43, 46, 53, 58, 63}
{0, 23, 29, 43, 46, 53, 58, 63}
This regime is drastically different from regimes A and B as there are now
cyclic groups in the holonomy decomposition. For these intermediate tempta-
tions to defect, the system has pools of reversibility where dynamical cycles may
recur, unlike the previous regimes where any non-trivial mappings induced by
words in SO would bring the system to a state in which the previous state is in-
accessible by the same transformation. This reversibility is entirely t-dependent
since any words made of locally constant maps which act non-trivially on a state
are by definition irreversible. Only when the temptation to defect is low enough
such that an action by t can bring the system to a new state of equivalent or
higher cooperation will mappings induced by words from SO form non-trivial
groups.
Additionally, the amount and distribution of open cells now play a significant
role in the system complexity. In general, KR complexity increases with the
number of open cells; yet for a given number of open cells, their distribution
plays a significant role (Table 2). Note the open cell configuration corresponding
to T ′123 = {d1, d2, d3, c1, c2, c3} has its upper bound of KR complexity reduced
from 6 to 4. This is because the configuration T ′1234 has KR complexity 4 and
T ′123 is a subsemigroup of T
′
1234. It follows naturally that (X,S1234) emulates
(X,S123) and from the KR complexity axioms [6], for transformation semigroups
(Y, T ) and (X,S), if (X,S) can emulate (Y, T ) then the complexity of (Y, T )
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must be less than or equal to that of (X,S).
Table 2: Unique open cell configurations for 2,3 & 4 open cells, represented in grey
Open Cell
Orientation
KR
Complexity
0 0 2 0 2 6 4 4 4 7
Groups in
Holonomy
Decomposition
— —
(3, C2)
(2, C2)
— (2, C2)
(4, C2)
(3, C2)
(2, C2)
(4, C2)
(3, C2)
(2, C2)
(4, C2)
(3, C2)
(2, C2)
(3, S3)
(4, C2)
(3, C2)
(2, C2)
Below are the orbits for a representation of the holonomy group (3, C2) found
in the holonomy decomposition (Figure 6a). This is one of two C2 permutator
groups in regime C with O = {1, 2}. The generator of this permutation group is
d2c1t which represents mapping cell 2 to defection, cell 1 to cooperation and then
letting one time step, t pass. Since the holonomy group (3, C2) shows the group
action on a set of 3 subsets permuted by permutations of 5 underlying states, the
exact mechanism leading to this reversibility is not immediately clear. We can
gain a better understanding of the dynamics of this cyclic group by examining
the orbits of the transformation d2c1t on specific states in these sets as shown
in the natural subsystem (Figure 6b).
{0,10,43,46}
{0,43,46,63}
d2c1td2c1t
{0,10,63} d2c1t
000000 d2c1t 001010
111111
d2c1td2c1t
101011 d2c1t 101110 d2c1t
(a) Orbits of holonomy group (3, C2) (b) Natural subsystem for transformation d2c1t
for transformation d2c1t
Figure 6: Orbits and natural subsystem for a (3, C2) found in regime C with
O = {1, 2}. Note states numbered 0, 10, 43, 45, and 63 in (a) correspond to strategy
distributions ‘000000’, ‘001010’, ‘101011’, ‘101110’, and ‘111111’ seen in (b), respec-
tively.
Most of these orbits act in an expected manner since for the two right-most
orbits, the locally constant mappings do not change the state and as the states
are mixed strategy equilibria for regime C, action by t does not change the state.
In the left-most orbit, the behaviour is also expected since d2c1 effectively turns
a pure defection state into one with a single cooperator which will receive the
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lowest payoff of its defecting neighbours, thus reverting back to defection with
t.
In the orbit second from the left in Fig. 6b, the behaviour is much more
interesting as the same transformation that removes four cooperators from the
system, also leads it into a state of pure cooperation. For state ‘001010’, d2c1
acts as simply c1 since cell 2 is already a defector. This maps the system to
state ‘101010’. As shown above, this state now maps to one of pure cooperation
with t. At the state of pure cooperation, d2c1 now acts as d2 mapping the state
to ‘101111’.
1
2
3
4
5
6
d2c1−−−→
1
2
3
4
5
6
t−−−−→
1
2
3
4
5
6
001010 101010 111111
1
2
3
4
5
6
d2c1−−−→
1
2
3
4
5
6
t−−−−→
1
2
3
4
5
6
111111 101111 001010
Figure 7: Dynamics of C2 generated by d2c1t
{16,21,23}
{16,21,55}
c3td1c2tc5c2tc2d3
{16,23,55}
c3tc2c5td1c2tc2d3c3td1c2tc5c2tc2d3
c3tc2c5td1c2tc2d3
c3tc2c5td1c2tc2d3
c3td1c2tc5c2tc2d3
Figure 8: Orbits of Holonomy Group (3, S3). The underlying states (strategy
distributions) of the corresponding natural subsystem are 16=‘01000’, 21=‘010101’,
23=‘010111’, and 55=‘101101’.
In this state, the single defector benefits from being surrounded by cooperators
receiving the highest net payoff as b > 3 and with t, all of its neighbours switch
to the defector strategy resulting in the state ‘001010’ (See Figure 7). These
pools of reversibility can offer some insight regarding the spatial configuration of
strategies which lead to the persistence of cooperation. Additionally, in regime
C, we see the only symmetric group (3, S3) in the holonomy decomposition
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(Figure 8). Here the two group generators are given by c3td1c2tc5c2tc2d3 and
c3tc2c5td1c2tc2d3 and although these words are long and hard to interpret, the
possibility of appearance of such non-abelian group dynamics is not an obvious
result of simple iterated PD.
3.4 Regime D
In regime D (b = 3.0), which can be interpreted as a weak PD, the temptation
to defect is very low and consequently the incentive to cooperate is highest.
Due to this push towards cooperation, there are less pools of reversibility than
in regime C and the highest upper bound for KR complexity is 2. From the
subduction chain (Figure 9), we see that all equilibria are mapped to by a single
time step t and a new class of equilibria emerge. (Also present are the “L-shape”
equilibria with two defectors in a row we encountered above.) This new class
represents a single defector, which in all previous regimes had been beneficial to
the lone defector. In this regime, the temptation to defect is low enough that
the system has become immune to invasion by a single defector.
X
{0, 23, 29, 31, 43, 46, 47, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63}
Figure 9: Subduction chain for
(X, 〈t〉) with b = 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 10: New class of equilibria
{31, 47, 55, 59, 61, 62} = [31]∼= ⊂ X
4 Conclusion
Representing the iterated PD as a transformation semigroup allows the holon-
omy decomposition to reveal qualitative differences between distinct payoff-
dependent regimes. When the temptation to defect is below a threshold, the
KR complexity becomes non-zero and pools of reversibility form. The number
of open cells also positively influences the KR complexity, however their spatial
distribution plays an equally important role. With greater computational power,
it would be interesting to further explore this system with a larger number of
players as well as different topologies to see how the results presented in this
paper compare to larger and more complex spatial configurations. With this
information, one could explore how the KR complexity varies with both spatial
size and configuration, as well as with the temptation to defect. Additionally, it
could lead to insights resulting in algebraic theorems for more general iterated
PD systems.
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